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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
COTTONWOOD MALL SHOPPING 
CENTER, INC., 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
PUBLIC-SERVICE COMMISSION 
OF UTAH, and FRANK S. WARNER 
and OLOF E. ZUNDEL, Commis-
sioners, and UTAH POWER AND 
LIGHT COMPANY, 
Defendants. 
Case No, 14568 
REPLY BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF 
The defendant, Public Service Commission of Utah, rested 
its whole argument on the question of Res Judicata and that is 
the principal basis of the arguments of defendant Utah Power 
and Light Company. The latter defendant also contends the Com-
mission correctly determined the plaintiff was not exempt from 
regulation. We address ourselves first to the matter of Res 
Judicata. 
Point I 
THE DOCTRINE OF RES JUDICATA DOES NOT APPLY IN THE COTTONWOOD 
xMALL CASE BECAUSE: 
1. THE FACTS, THE IDENTITY OF THE SUBJECT MATTER AND THE 
IDENTITY IN THE QUALITY OF PERSONS INVOLVED HAVE 
CHANGED. 
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2. THE BURDEN IS ON THE PARTY ASSERTING RES JUDICATA 
TO ESTABLISH BY AFFIRMATIVE PROOF, THAT THE CAUSE 
OF ACTION INVOLVED AND THE PARTIES ARE IDENTICAL IN 
THIS CASE. 
3. UNDER THE ERIE CASE THE STATE COURT SHOULD DECIDE 
HOW UTAH LAW APPLIES IN UTAH. 
4. IF RES ADJUDICATA IS TO APPLY, A PERSON SHOULD NOT BE 
BOUND BY A JUDGMENT UNLESS HE HAS HAD ADEQUATE OPPOR-
TUNITY TO LITIGATE MATTERS ADJUDICATED AGAINST HIM. 
5. THE LAW OF THE LAND HAS CHANGED SINCE THE FEDERAL 
COURT RULED IN THE COTTONWOOD MALL CASE. 
1. MOST JURISDICTIONS INDICATED THAT IN ORDER TO APPLY THE RES 
JUDICATE DOCTRINE, THERE MUST BE FOUR ELEMENTS PRESENT: 
a. Identity of subject matter, 
b. Identity of cause of action, 
c. Identity of persons and parties, 
d. Identity in the quality of persons for or against whom 
the claim is made. 
Cooper v Warnock, Wash., 134 P2 706, 709 
Smith v Gray, Nevada, 250 P 369 
Pompanio v Larsen, Colorado, 251 P. 534 
Paroutsis v Gregory, Penn., 35 A2 559 
Res Judicata can apply only when the issues are identical. 
Emerson Estate v Cook, 111., 50 NE2 772 
McCormick v Hartman, Mich., 10 NW2 910 
Klassen v Central Kansas Corp., Kans., 165 P2 601, 606 
Res Judicata is not available where the issue in an actior 
differs in any way from the issue in our earlier action betwe« 
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the same parties. 
Cartey v Klein, New York, 24 NYS2 67 68 
When it appears an issue was not determined by judgment, 
it is not Res judicata. 
Stark v Coher, Calif., 129 P2 290, 393 
Panos v Great Western, Calif., 126 P2 889, 895 
In the case of West Jordon, Inc., 7 Utah 2d 391, 326 P2d105, 
1958, certain land owners obtained a judgment for severance from 
the town by a District Court decree. About two weeks later the 
town passed an ordinance annexing the lands theretofore severed. 
The landowner brought another action and the Honorable A. H. Ellett 
dismissed the suit on grounds of Res Judicata. The Supreme Court 
reversed the lower court on the theory that the cause of action had 
changed. 
"Since the lands did not again become part of the 
territory of the town until two weeks after the 
severance in the prior action, their petition did 
not involve the same cause of action even though 
part of the subject matter was the same and the 
same reasons were given for desiring the serverance." 
"Since this action is based on a new and different 
ordinance which necessarily requires the determina-
tion of essentially different facts from those 
determined in the previous action that doctrine 
can have no application to this case." 
Obviously this case shows how liberal the Utah Courts are 
on the matter of Res Judicata. The Cottonwood Mall case has a 
much stronger basis to show a change of facts and cause of action. In 
the Cottonwood Mall case the facts have changed, the identity of the 
subject matter has changed and the identity of the quality of per-
son has changed. One of the principal pegs on which the Federal 
Court hung its hat was the fact that Eldredge Furniture Company 
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had purchased its store area and owned that one section of the 
Cottonwood Mall. The fact is that now, and at the time appli-
cation was made to the Public Service Commission, Eldredge 
Furniture had sold its space back to the Mall so the plaintiff 
owned all of the Cottonwood Mall property. Obviously the facts 
have changed. The identity of the subject matter has changed 
in that plaintiff now owns all the property. The identity of 
the quality of person has changed in that the Federal Court 
found the Mall would be a utility and now it would not be a 
utility. We do not concede that the Federal Court made a 
correct decision even in view of the Eldredge ownership, but 
certainly this change is a material change sufficient to take 
the case outside of the bounds of Red Judicata and is sufficient 
to open the matter for a decision of this court on its merits 
or for a reversal to send back to the Public Service Commis-
sion to rule the plaintiff is exempt. 
In the case of East Mill Creek Water Co. v Salt Lake City 
Utah 1945, 159 P2d 863, the court held: 
"Where claim, demand or cause of action is different 
in the two cases, then judgment in the €>arlier cases 
is res judicata of the later only to extent that the 
earlier judgment actually raised and decided the same 
points and issues which are raised in the later case." 
This case followed numberous other Utah cases as follows 
Everill v. Swan, 20 Utah 56, 57 P. 716. Glen Allen 
Mining Co. v. Park Galena Mining Co., 77 Utah 362, 
296 P. 231; Leone v. Zuniga, 84 Utah 417, 34 P. 2d 
699; Logan City v. Utah Power & Light Co., 86 Utah 
340, 16 P. 2d 1097, on rehearing, 86 Utah 354, 44 
P. 2d 698; State v. Erwin, 101 Utah 365 at page 
422, 120 P 2d 285 at page 315. 
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46 Am Jur 2d, Judgments §44 3 states: 
"Clearly, the enforcement of the rule of res Judi-
cata may not be avoided by the discovery of new 
evidence bearing on a fact or issue invovled in 
the original action, as distinguished from a sub-
sequent fact or event which creates a new legal 
situation, even though the newly discovered evi-
dence might have been sufficient to justify a new 
trial in the first case. However, where, after 
the rendition of a judgment, subsequent events 
occur, creating a new legal situation or altering 
the legal rights or relations of the litigants, 
the judgment may thereby be precluded from operating 
as an estoppel. In such case, the earlier adjudi-
cation is not permitted to bar a new action to 
vindicate rights subsequently acquired, even if the 
same property is the subject matter of both actions." 
The many footnote cases include California, Idaho and 
Washington cases. 
§443 goes on to say: 
"In this connection, it has been declared that the 
doctrine of res judicata extends only to facts and 
conditions as they existed at the time the judg-
ment was rendered, and that a judgment is not res 
judicata as to rights which were not in existence 
at the time of the rendition of the judgment. It 
has even been held that the effect of a judgment 
as res judicata may be preduced by events creating 
a new legal situation occurring pendente lite before 
the rendition of the judgment, where a supplemental 
pleading is not filed." 
§382 discussing merger of cause of action in Judgment 
states: 
"However, the doctrine of merger of a cause of action 
in the judgment rendered thereon is calculated to pro-
mote justice, and will be applied with due considera-
tion of the demands of justice and equity; it may be 
carried no further than the ends of justice require." 
Adam v Davies, Utah, 156 P2207 158 ALR 852*§383 
tells us that this doctrine and the doctrine of Res Judicata 
may be regarded as identical. 
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Restatement Judgments §54 states that where a judgment 
is rendered for the defendant on the ground of the nonexistence 
of some fact essential to the plaintiff's cause of action, the 
plaintiff is not precluded from maintaining an action after 
such fact has subsequently come into existence. 
Even in the Knight case cited by both defendants, only 
part of the facts were considered as affected by Res Judicata, 
not the whole case. 
In asserting that no facts were presented in evidence 
at the argument before the Public Service Commission the de-
fendants are admitting that they did not present any evidence 
to show that the facts in this case are the same as the facts 
in the case before the Federal Court. The burden is clearly 
on the moving party to prove circumstances are the same. 
Parties asserting Res Judicata must establish, by 
affirmative proof, that the cause of action invQlved 
and parties are identical as in this case. McCann 
v Iowa Mutual Liability Ins. 1 NW2 682, 688 
2. NEITHER THE UTAH COURTS NOR OTHER COURTS HAVE STRICTLY 
FOLLOWED THE PRINCIPLE OF RES JUDICATA. JUSTICE AND PUB-
LIC POLICY ARE THE CONTROLLING CONSIDERATIONS. 
In the recentAcase of Tates, Inc v Little America,535 
P2 1228 and 5S% P2 /j£ 5*7 , this court first reversed the lower 
courts judgment for defendant in favor of the plaintiff and 
remanded the case back to the lower court. The lower court 
granted the defendant's motion for a new trial and religated 
the same issues over the objections of the plaintiff. On the 
second appeal, this court upheld the lower court despite the 
principle of Res Judicata. 
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46 Am Jur 2d, Judgments §402 states: 
"The doctrine of res judicata may be said to adhere 
in legal systems as the rule of justice. Hence, the 
position has been taken that the doctrine of res 
judicata is to be applied in particular situations 
as fairness and justice require, and that it is not 
to be applied so rigidly as to defeat the ends of 
justice or so as to work as injustice. 
The sound policy behind the doctrine is also to be 
considered in applying the doctrine. . . Moreover, 
there are exceptions to the doctrine as res judicata 
based upon other important reasons of policy. In 
this respect it has been declared that res judicata, 
as the embodiment of a public policy, must at times 
be weighed against competing interests, and must, 
on occasion, yield to other policies. The determina-
tion of the question concerning judicial reconsid-
eration is said to require a compromise, in each 
case of the two opposing policies, of the desirab-
ility and finality and the public interest in reach-
ing the right result. 
Underlying all discussion of the problem must be 
the principle of fundamental fairness in the due 
process sense. It has accordingly been adjudged 
that the public policy underlying the principle of 
res judicata must be considered together with the 
policy that a party shall not be deprived of a fair 
adversary proceeding in which to present his case. 
It has also been declared that a determination of 
issues in an action between private parties cannot 
bar a contest to vindicate the public interest." 
3. UNDER THE ERIE CASE, THE STATE COURT SHOULD DECIDE HOW UTAH 
LAW APPLIES IN UTAH. 
Justice Brandeis in the Erie v Tompkins case, 304 US 
64 in overruling the Tysen case states: 
"Except in matters governed by the Federal Constitu-
tion or by Acts of Congress, the law to be applied 
in any case in the law of the State. And whether 
the law of the State shall be declared by its Legis-
lature in a statute or by its highest court in a 
decision is not a matter of federal concern." 
and the Justice goes on to say this rule of law is necessary 
to preserve, "the autonomy and independence of the states -
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independence in their legislative and independence in their 
judicial departments." This principle was followed by Justice 
Frankfurter in the Guaranty Trust Co, v York case, 326 U.S. 99. 
The plaintiff contends the Federal Court did not follow 
the law in Utah, instead it declared that no law had been made 
on the subject. We contend that the law was made on the sub-
ject. We contend that the law was made on the subject as set 
forth in our main brief pages 10 through 13 both by the courts 
and the legislature. The legislature made it clear that com-
panies like the plaintiff should not be regarded as Utilities 
but were exempt where distributuion is through "private pro-
perty, i.e., property not dedicated to public use, solely 
for his own use or use of his tenants. . . ". The reasoning 
of counsel for the defendant is fallacious and unsound when 
they argue that the legislation exception does not apply to 
Mall because no Malls were in existence in 1917 when the law 
was enacted. That is like saying the U.S. Constitution does 
not apply to the jet, rocket, calculator, T.V. and computer age 
we are in now because they didn't exist 200 years ago. That 
great constitution still rules our greatly advance civilization 
with only a few admendments. The exception doesnft have to 
identify each case specifically wherein it applies; but, obvious 
the exception applies to all property "not dedicated to public 
use". 
THE UTAH COURT IS NOT FORECLOSED FROM NOW ANNOUNCING 
THE LAW IN THIS MATTER. 
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In the case of Atkins v Schmutz Manufacturing Co., 
2 
372 Fed. 762, decided in 1967, involved a question of 
whether a Kentucky one-year statute of limitation or a two-
year Virginia statute of limitation applies to a complaint 
filed in a Kentucky Federal Court when the tart occurred in 
Virginia. The Federal Court had previously held in several 
cases, following the Kentucky state courts rulings, that the 
Virginia two-year statute would apply. The plaintiff relied 
on those federal and state court cases when it filed its com-
plaint in 1963, after the one-year limitation had expired. 
The Kentucky court suddenly specifically reversed itself and 
"expressly overruled" its previous cases before this case was 
concluded which required the Federal Court to reverse its pre-
vious decision in order to follow state law. Obviously the 
state court can reserve its position or clarify its position 
and the Federal Court must follow the State Courts rulings. 
The cases cited by defendant and particularly Ham v. 
Holy Rosary Hospital are not in point. The Ham case in-
volved constitutional questions that, of course, involved fed-
eral law not state law. 
4. IF RES JUDICATA IS TO APPLY A PERSON SHOULD NOT BE BOUND 
BY A JUDGMENT UNLESS HE HAS HAD ADEQUATE OPPORTUNITY TO 
LITIGATE MATTERS ADJUDICATED AGAINST HIM. 
In the Federal Court the plaintiff did not have his 
day in court and never had an opportunity to present evidence 
since the Federal Court on a motion to dismiss converted it to 
a Motion for Summary Judgment and ruled against the plaintiff. 
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Again before the Public Service Commission the defendant, 
Utah Power & Light, moved for dismissal and it was granted 
without taking any evidence or giving the plaintiff a chance 
to be heard. The case of Davis v. First National Bank of 
Waco (Texas), 161 SW2 467, holds that under Res Judicata a 
person should not be bound by a judgment unless he has had 
an adequate opportunity to litigate matters adjudicated against 
him. In the North Dakota case, Knutson v Ekren, 5 NW2 74, the 
court held the issues must be fully tried and litigated. 
5. THE LAW OF THE LAND HAS CHANGED SINCE THE FEDERAL COURT 
RULING. 
The Judge Ritter decree in the Cottonwood Mall case 
was dated July 11, 1969, holding the shopping center would 
not be a public utility. The Lloyd v Tanner case cited and 
quoted extensively in our original brief was decided by the 
United States Supreme Court in June, 1972, reversing the lower 
court and holding that the center was private property and 
holding that the shopping center had not dedicated any part 
of its property to public use even though roads through it 
were public and even though it held the same kind of non busi-
ness functions that the Cottonwood Mall held. This ruling in 
effect overruled the former law of the land laid out in the 
Logan valley decision. 
We call to the courts attention a new U.S. Supreme Court 
case, Scott Hudgens v National Labor Relations Board, 47 L Ed 
2d 196, decided March 3, 1976. This case involved picketing 
of a privately owned shopping center. The shopping center 
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tried to stop the picketing in the center. The National Labor 
Relations Board held against the center even in view of the 
Lloyd case and the Court of Appeals enforced the Board's order. 
The U.S. Supreme Court vacated the Court of Appeal's judgment 
and held in favor of the shopping center using the Lloyd case 
as the chief basis of its ruling. The majority held that the 
holding in the Lloyd case "amounted to a total rejection of the 
holding and rational in the Logal valley decision". The shopp-
ing center was private property. What the Lloyd case and the 
Hudgens cases means to the Cottonwood Mall case is that the 
mall must be held to be private property and the fact that it 
serves customers and the public both paying and non paying, 
that its facilities are not converted to public facilities. 
And the light and power provided whether to paying customers 
or non paying customers, whether during regular business hours 
or on off hours, the power is for its own use or its tenants use. 
46 Am Jur 2d, Judgment §444 
"It is particularly with respect to the doctrine 
of collateral estoppel precluding the religation 
of an issue adjudicated in the previous action on 
a difference cause of action, that a change in the 
law after the rendition of the judgment operates 
to deny conclusiveness to the judgment. 
The rules that a judgment may be denied a conclu-
sive effect because there has been a change in 
the law since its rendition has also been regarded 
as applicable to a change in the law by interme-
diate judicial decision of either a state or a 
federal court." 
Point II 
THE COTTONWOOD MALL ELECTRICAL PLANT IS EXEMPT FROM 
REGULATION BY THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION. 
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We have already presented argument on this matter in 
our prior brief so we present only a few cases to further 
rebut the defendant's allegations. 
In the 1968 Massachusetts case, Re Frank Properties, 
Inc. 72 PUR 3d 305, where applicant applied for an advisory 
ruling on the question of whether a shopping center landlord 
proposing to furnish tenants "total energy service" would be 
subject to regulation. After a well considered opinion, a 
copy of which is attached, the Public Utilities Department 
ruled that the landlord would not be a public utility. The 
ruling has stood in effect thereafter. The case is signifi-
cant because the analyzed leading court cases dealing with 
"total energy" from Pennsylvania (Drexellrook Associates v 
Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission, 1965, 212 A 2d 237), 
from Wisconsin (Re City of Sun Prairie, 1965, 57 PUR 3d 525 
and General Split Corp., 1962, 44 PUR 3d 334), from New Jersey 
(Freehold Water & Utility Co. v Silver Mobile Home Park, 1967, 
68 PUR 3d 523). 
In the case Cleveland Electric Illuminating Company 
where the Ohio Shopping Centers Asso. Intervened, 53 PUR 3d 
234, 1964, held that the Ohio Public Utilities Commission had 
no jurisdiction over sales of electrical energy by the Shopping 
Center and that the Shopping Center was not a public utility. 
In Llano, Inc v Southern Union Gas Co., N.M. 1964, 399 
P 2d 646, the court considered the case where Llano purchased 
natural gas for delivery and resale to one industrial customer. 
They quote from 73 CJS Public Utilities §2 and from 4 3 Am Jur 
571 Public Utilities and then states: 
-13-
"Applying these rules to the facts in the instant 
case we think the conclusion is inescapable that 
Llano at no time held itself out as engaged in 
supplying natural gas "to or for the public," or 
to any limited portion of the public which might 
require natural gas, to the extent of Llano's 
capacity. It is now legally committed to serve 
but one private industry, and has held itself 
out as willing to serve only such other private 
industrial users as its selects, if and when 
additional natural gas reserves are available 
to it. Nor do we find any evidence, in support 
of the Commission's finding and/or conclusion, 
that Llano has held and is holding itself as 
ready, willing and able to provide natural gas 
service to or for the public or any segment thereof." 
We also attach a copy of the City of San Prairie case 
(1967) and the Drexellrook case (1965). Both of these cases in-
volved landlords of big apartment complexes. The Public Util-
ities laws of each state are about the same as that in the state 
of Utah "providing gas or electrity to or for the public". 
The principal of Res Judicata does not apply in the 
Cottonwood Mall case and clearly the mall operation is exempt 
from regulation by the commission. 
Wherefore, we pray the Honorable Court reverse the rul-
ing of the Public Service Commission finding the Cottonwood Mall 
is exempt from regulation by the commission. 
Respectfully submitted, 
y 
/Keith E. Sohm 
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Copies of the foregoing Reply were served upon defen-
dants by mailing first class to attorneys for defendants, Rob-
ert Gordon, P. 0. Box 899 Salt Lake City, Utah 84110, and to 
G. Blaine Davis, 236 State Capitol Building., Salt Lake City, 
Utah, 84114, dated this 3rd day of November, 1967. 
/ -- , ' - / / 
Keith E. Sohm 
Append ix A 
RE FRANK PROPERTIES, INC. 
MASSACHUSETTS DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC UTILITIES 
Re Frank Properties, Inc 
D.P.U. 15715 
January 29, 1968 
APPLICATION for advisory riding on question whether shop-. ping center landlord proposing to furnish tenants total 
energy service would be subject to regtdation; ruling granted, 
and proposed operation found not subject to regulation. 
Public utilities, §11 — Advisory ruling as to utility status — Landlord total energy 
service. 
1. Upon application for an advisory ruling on the question whether a shop-
ping center landlord which proposes to furnish total energy service to its 
tenants would be subject to utility regulation, the department of public 
utilities would exercise its discretion to give such a ruling where the land-
lord proposed to make a substantial investment and where the total energy 
concept was receiving wide attention at the time, p. 306. 
Public utilities, §23 — Regulation dependent upon sale of service — Statute. 
2. A Massachusetts statute which subjects to regulation "all . . . cor-
porations which . . . operate works . . . for the manufacture and 
sale or distribution and sale of gas . . . or of electricity" makes regula-
tion dependent upon the existence of a sale, unlike statutes in other jurisdic-
tions which make regulation dependent upon the public nature of the activity, 
p. 307. 
Public utilities, §41 — Landlord "total energy" services to tenants. 
3. A shopping center landlord is not a gas or electric company subject to 
regulation under a statute subjecting to regulation "all . . . corporations 
which . . . operate works . . . for the manufacture and sale or dis-
tribution and sale of gas . . . or of electricity" where the landlord, 
using gas either directly or converting it, proposed to provide total energy 
service—heating, electric current, domestic hot water, and chilled water for 
air conditioning—for which each tenant initially will pay 55 cents per annum 
per square foot as an additional component of the rental, and where the 
landlord will make meter readings of such service to tenants for two years, 
on which to establish charges for the remainder of 10-year leases without 
regard to the quantity of energy consumed by the tenants during such 
period: the commission found that the arrangement was "rent inclusion," 
p. 308. 
By the D E P A R T M E N T : On July 10, with tenants under which it proposes 
1967, Frank Properties, Inc., a Del- to supply tenants with various energy 
aware corporation engaged in the busi- requirements, commonly known as 
ness of owning and operating shopping "tot?I energy" plan, filed a request for 
centers, having entered into leases an advisory ruling, pursuant to § 8 of 
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Chap 30A of the General Laws, "as 
to the legality of the proposed plan in 
the light of the regulations and stat-
utes administered . . ." by the 
department of public utilities, if it con-
ducted activities described herein. 
Documents and written representa-
tions as to the operations of Frank 
Properties, Inc., have been received 
by the department. The Massachu-
setts Electric Company was given an 
opportunity to be heard in this matter 
and declined this opportunity. 
[1] The promulgation of advisory 
rulings is discretionary with the de-
partment. Since Frank Properties, 
Inc., proposes to make a substantial 
investment, the advisability of which 
may depend in large part on the legal 
effect of the proposed operation and 
since the total energy concept is one 
that is receiving wide attention,1 the 
department believes that this is an ap-
propriate matter for an advisory rul-
ing. It must be emphasized that the 
ruling relates to the specific facts set 
forth in this opinion, and any variation 
from these facts in this or any other 
case might require a different ruling. 
In addition, it is important that the 
issue we are ruling on be precisely de-
fined. The request for the ruling states 
the issue in terms of "legality" which 
is too general. The arrangement 
might or might not be legal for a com-
pany subject to Chap 164. There is a 
threshold question, however; namely, 
whether this arrangement would con-
stitute Frank Properties, Inc., a "gas 
company" or an "electric company" 
under the provisions of §§ 1 and 2 of 
Chap 164 of the General Laws. In 
this opinion we address ourselves to 
*See, e.g., address of Ernest W. Gibson, 
Chairman, Public Service Board of Vermont, 
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that question alone and we note no de-
termination as to the propriety of this 
arrangement for a company which is 
subject to regulation under Chap 164. 
Frank Properties, Inc., has entered 
into leases with various tenants for a 
shopping center in Worcester, Massa-
chusetts. It will purchase gas from 
the Worcester Gas Company and will 
use the gas directly, or by converting 
it, for all the energy requirements of 
the tenants. Under its lease arrange-
ment the landlord will supply heating 
and chilling water for air conditioning 
and heating, electric current, and do-
mestic hot water. Each tenant will 
pay 55 cents per annum, per square 
foot as an additional component of 
this rental. 
Each lease will be for a minimum 
period of ten years. During the first 
two years meters will be installed to 
measure the tenant's consumption of 
electricity, heating, cooling, and do-
mestic hot water. The meters will be 
read each month and the tenant will 
be furnished a copy of the reading. At 
the end of two years a new charge for 
the services will be fixed, determined 
on the basis of the following: (a) 
Average cost of filters used, (b) meter 
readings based on the unit cost for 
electricity at the rate of .0131 cents 
per kilowatt-hour, heating .0183 cents 
per unit of 10,000 Btu, cooling .0272 
cents per unit of 10,000 Btu, domestic 
hot water .125 cents per 100 gallons 
exclusive of normal water charges. 
The amount previously paid by the 
tenant during the 2-year period will 
be adjusted and the tenant will pay the 
new fixed charge during the remainder 
of the lease term without regard to the 
Ne\y England Public Utility Commissioners 
Conference, June 26-28, 1967. 
RE FRANK PROPERTIES, INC. 
quantity of energy he consumes dur-
ing this period. 
[2] Our determination is governed 
by the provisions of §§1 and 2 of 
Chap 164, which delineate the entities 
that are subject to regulation by this 
department and have the duties and 
obligations of public utilities (although 
that term is not used in the chapter). 
Section 1 determines which domestic 
corporations are subject to Chap 164, 
and is not therefore applicable to 
Frank Properties, Inc. Section 2, 
however, contains substantially iden-
tical definitions applicable to foreign 
corporations. The difference between 
the two sections is that foreign corpo-
rations are not subject to certain types 
of regulation, principally control of 
security issues. 
Section 2 provides that substantially 
all the other regulatory provisions 
shall apply to "all . . . corpora-
tions which . . . operate works 
. . . for the manufacture and sale 
or distribution and sale of gas . . . 
or of electricity . . . ." 
Because of this special language 
defining the jurisdiction of this de-
partment, decisions in other states re-
lating to similar arrangements between 
landlord and tenants are not appropri-
ate. In Drexelbrook Associates v 
Pennsylvania Pub. Utility Commis-
sion (1965) 418 Pa 430, 60 PUR3d 
175, 212 A2d 237, the landlord pro-
posed to acquire certain equipment 
from the electric and water company 
serving it. It would then buy gas, 
water, and electricity at certain meter-
ing points and distribute the gas, wa-
ter, and electricity to tenants who 
would be separately metered and 
charged by the landlord. The com-
mission denied the application of the 
companies to sell the equipment be-
cause the consummation of the trans-
action would make the landlord a 
"public utility'' for which a separate 
authorization of the commission was 
required. The Pennsylvania supreme 
court reversed. The applicable statute 
defined a "public utility" as one fur-
nishing gas or electricity "to . . . 
the public/' and, the court held, serv-
ice limited to tenants only was not 
service to the "public." 
Similarly, in Freehold Water & 
Utility Co. v Silver Mobile Home 
Park (NJ 1967) 68 PUR3d 523, a 
mobile home park owner which sup-
plied water to its tenants was held not 
to be a public utility under a statute 
which defined utility as a company 
which supplied water for "public use." 
Among the reasons cited by the com-
mission were the absence of metering, 
the limitation of service to tenants, 
and the incidental nature of the opera-
tion of the water supply as compared 
to the main business of the trailer 
park. 
The Wisconsin Public Service Com-
mission dealt with a "total energy" 
arrangement in Re City of Sun Prairie 
(Wis 1965) 57 PUR3d 525, and held 
that the landlord was not a "public 
utility" because the use of energy, be-
ing limited to tenants was not being 
supplied to the "public," as provided 
in the statute. It was pointed out that 
there would be no submetering though 
apparently no reliance was placed on 
this fact. See also General Split Corp. 
v P.&V. Atlas Industrial Center, Inc. 
(Wis 1962) 44 PUR3d 334. 
It is the public nature of the activity 
which controls regulatory jurisdiction 
in these states. Whether gas or elec-
tricity is being sold is only incidentally 
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relevant if at all. The cases are there-
fore not persuasive in construing our 
statute which makes no reference to 
the "public," but makes regulation 
depend on the existence of a "sale." 
On the other hand, our decisions 
(and those of the supreme judicial 
court) relating to ''resale" of electric-
ity, though not directly related to pos-
sible regulatory jurisdiction over 
landlords, furnish useful clues as to 
the meaning of our statute as applied 
to total energy arrangements. In Re 
Boston Edison Co. (Mass 1953) 98 
PUR NS 427, affd sub nom. Boston 
Real Estate Board v Massachusetts 
Dept. of Pub. Utilities (1956) 334 
Mass 477, 15 PUR3d 47, 136 NE2d 
243, we held that Boston Edison Com-
pany was justified in filing a tariff 
under which no power would be sold 
within the territory in which it sold 
electricity to any person purchasing the 
power for resale. By this tariff amend-
ment the company brought an end to 
the practice of landlords purchasing 
power at wholesale rates and sub-
metering it to their tenants. There 
was no occasion to decide whether 
such landlords were themselves sub-
ject to regulation, but it is clear from 
the language that this department and 
the supreme judicial court considered 
that the practice constituted a "resale." 
Compare A. W. Perry, Inc. v Boston 
Edison Co. (Mass 1947) 70 PUR NS 
161; Re Boston Edison Co. (Mass 
1949) D.P.U. 8228. 
[3] If Frank Properties, Inc., pro-
posed to meter the electricity or gas 
consumed by each tenant and charge 
on the basis of the meter reading, we 
would be constrained to hold that this 
constituted a "sale" of gas or electric-
ity, subjecting Frank Properties, Inc., 
to regulation under Chap 164. Re 
Lowell (Mass 1957) D.P.U. 11694. 
This is not such a case, however. The 
charge which the landlord proposes to 
make covers far more than the use of 
electricity or gas. It includes, for ex-
ample, heating and cooling. Although 
the fuel cost may be a component to 
his charge to the tenant, it cannot be 
separately stated apart from the cost 
of equipment and labor necessary to 
provide the tenant with heat. The use 
of meters described herein does not 
make the arrangement a sale of gas or 
electricity. At most, only the elec-
tricity portion of the charge could be 
said to be directly measured. The use 
of gas for heating and air conditioning 
is only indirectly measured through 
the measurement of heat. 
The controlling fact is that over the 
entire course of the lease the charge 
will not be based on measured con-
sumption, even of the electric portion 
of the charge. Because the total energy 
concept is new, it is difficult to esti-
mate the portion of the rent that the 
landlord must charge for heat, hot 
water, air conditioning, and electricity. 
The metering for the 2-year period 
merely provides a basis for estimating 
a fair rental of the premises. The sit-
uation is not significantly different 
from that of an apartment building 
landlord who supplies heat and hot 
water and electricity to the tenants 
without metering. The difference is 
that this landlord through the accumu-
lated experience of apartment house 
owners is able to estimate with reason-
able certainty the cost to him of sup-
plying these services over the long 
run. The metering in this case pro-
vides for a new arrangement on the 
same basis as exists for the long-stand-
72 PUR 3d 308 
ing practice with respect to apartment 
houses. 
Accordingly, we believe that the ar-
rangement described herein is rent in- or an electric company, 
elusion as that term was used in 
D.P.U. S862, and we rule that on 
these facts the landlord Frank Proper-
ties, Inc., would not be a gas company 
Appendix B 
SUN PRAIRIE v PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION 
WISCONSIN SUPREME COURT 
City of Sun Prairie 
V 
Wisconsin Public Service Commission 
Additional respondents: Lewis P. Brooks, Brooks Equipment 
Leasing, Inc., and Wisconsin Gas Company 
— Wis 2d —, 154 NW2d 360 
November 28, 1967 
APPEAL from judgment affirming commission decision that landlord providing services to tenants was not public 
utility; affirmed. For commission decision, see (1965) 57 
PUR3d 525 
Statutes, §11 — Judicial construction. 
1. A construction given to a statute by the court becomes a part thereof 
unless the legislature subsequently amends the statute to effect a change, 
p. 418. 
Public utilities, §41 — Services by apartment complex to tenants. 
2. A landlord of a large apartment complex furnishing heat, water, light, 
and power to all tenants-, but not serving any adjoining landowners or the 
public generally, is not a public utility and therefore not subject to commis-
sion jurisdiction, p. 418. 
Proceeding by plaintiff city of Sun not require a certificate of convenience 
Prairie to review a declaratory ruling and necessity. 
of the Public Service Commission of The city of Sun Prairie, which is 
Wisconsin that the project of defend- a public utility operating under an in-
ant Brooks Equipment Leasing, Inc. determinate permit to furnish electric 
(hereinafter "Brooks"), in furnishing heat, light, and power to the public 
heat, power, light, and water to its within its boundaries, made applica-
tenants in its multiple apartment com- Hon to the commission for such de-
plex does not bring Brooks within the claratory ruling on July 23, 1964. 
definition of a "public utility" as de- Brooks was then the owner of a 15-
fined by § 196.01(1), Statutes. Lewis acre parcel of land in the city of Sun 
P. Brooks, its president, was also Prairie on which it proposed to con-
joined as a party defendant. Because struct a 240-unit apartment project 
Brooks was not a public utility, the housed in 15 buildings that will house 
commission determined Brooks was up to 1,000 people. Heat, light, water, 
not within its jurisdiction and did and power will be supplied by Brooks 
[27] 417 71 PUR 3d 
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to all tenants in the project. Natural 
gas will be purchased by it to operate 
engines which will drive four electrical 
generators with a total capacity of 
500 kw. Heat-recovery equipment 
will utilize waste heat from the en-
gines to furnish low-pressure steam 
to heat and air condition all 240 
apartment units. No water, electric-
ity, or heat will be supplied to adjoin-
ing landowners or to the public 
generally. The rents paid by the ten-
ants wiU cover the expense of the 
utility services, so that they will not 
be separately billed for same. Brooks 
will rent an apartment "to any re-
sponsible person" who is able to pay 
the rent. 
After the commission made its 
declaratory ruling, the city of Sun 
Prairie petitioned the commission for 
a rehearing. Upon the denial of such 
petition, the city then instituted the 
instant review proceeding in circuit 
court. 
By judgment entered February 13, 
1967, the circuit court affirmed the 
declaratory ruling of the commission, 
and the city has appealed. 
The Wisconsin Gas Company, 
which sells gas to Brooks for use 
in its project, appeared in the pro-
ceedings before the commission and in 
the review before the circuit court, and 
opposed the city's petition. 
APPEARANCES : Petersen, Suther-
land, Axley & Brynelson, Madison, 
Wilmer E. Trodahl, City Attorney, 
Sun Prairie, for appellant; Bronson 
C. La Follette, Attorney General, 
William E. Torkelson and Clarence 
B. Sorenson, Madison, for Public 
Service Commission; Stafford, Rosen-
baum, Rieser & Hansen, Madison, for 
71 PUR 3d 4 
Lewis P. Brooks and Brooks Equip-
ment Leasing, Inc.; Foley, Sammond 
& Lardner, Vernon A. Swanson, and 
N. J. Lesselyoung, Milwaukee, for 
respondent Wisconsin Gas Company. 
CURRIE, Ch. J.: 
[1,2] The issue on this appeal is 
whether the landlord of a large com-
plex which furnishes heat, light, water, 
and power to its tenants is a public 
utility within the definition of § 196.01 
(1), Stats, so as to be under the 
jurisdiction of the public service com-
mission. This statute defines a public 
utility as follows: 
" 'Public utility' means and em-
braces every corporation, company, 
individual, . . . town, village, or 
city that may own, operate, manage, 
or control . . . any part of a plant 
or equipment, within the state . . . 
for the production, transmission, de-
livery, or furnishing of heat, light, 
water, or power either directly or in-
directly to or for the public. . . ." 
We deem Cawker v Meyer1 to be 
determinative of the result. In that 
case the landlord constructed a build-
ing in the city of Milwaukee to be 
rented for stores, offices, and light 
manufacturing purposes, A steam 
plant was installed therein to generate 
heat, electric light, and power to be 
furnished to the tenants and occupants 
of the building who desired such util-
ity service. Since the landlord was 
unable to dispose of all the heat and 
electricity to his tenants, he entered 
into contracts with three adjoining 
property owners to furnish them heat 
and power. 
The Wisconsin Railroad Commis* 
* (1911) 147 Wis 320. 133 NW 157, 37 
LRA NS 510. 
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sion, which had jurisdiction over 
public utilities at that time, contended 
that the landlord was a "public util-
ity" as defined in § 1797m-l, Stats 
(now § 196.01(1), Stats). The com-
mission argued that the furnishing of 
heat, light, and power "to anyone else 
than to one's self is furnishing it to 
the public within the meaning of the 
statute."* This court stated: 
". . . It was not the furnishing 
of heat, light, or power to tenants, or, 
incidentally, to a few neighbors, that 
the legislature sought to regulate, but 
the furnishing of those commodities to 
the public; that is, to whoever might 
require the same. Wisconsin River 
Tmprov. Co. v Pier (1908) 137 Wis 
325, 118 NW 857, 21 LRA NS 538. 
The use to which the plant, equipment, 
or some portion thereof is put must 
be for the public, in order to consti-
tute it a public utility. But whether 
or not the use is for the public does 
not necessarily depend upon the num-
ber of consumers; for there may be 
only one. . . . On the other hand, 
a landlord may furnish it to a hundred 
tenants, or, incidentally, to a few 
neighbors, without coming under the 
letter or the intent of the law. In the 
instant case, the purpose of the plant 
was to serve the tenants of the owners, 
a restricted class, standing in a cer-
tain contract relation with them, and 
not the public. . . . 
• • • • • • 
". . . The tenants of a landlord 
are not the public; neither are a few 
of his neighbors, or a few isolated 
individuals with whom he may choose 
*Id, 147 Wis at p. 324. 133 NW at p. 153. 
3 Id. 147 Wis at pp. 324-32(3, 133 NW at 
p. 158, 
to deal, though they are a part of the 
public. The word 'public' must be 
construed to mean more than a lim-
ited class defined by the relation of 
landlord and tenant, or by nearness 
of location, as neighbors, or more 
than a few who, by reason of any 
peculiar relation to the owner of the 
plant, can be served by him. 
". . . [The statute] was not in-
tended to affect the relation of land-
lord and tenant, or to abridge the 
right to contract with a few neighbors 
for a strictly incidental purpose, 
though relating to a service covered 
by it."3 
Chapter 499, Laws of 1907, which 
provided for the regulation of public 
utilities and contained the definition 
of "public utility" found in § I797m-1 
(now § 196.01(1), Stats) had become 
generally known as the Public Utili-
ties Law.4 The commission to which 
this regulation had been entrusted was 
the then recently created Wisconsin 
Railroad Commission. John Barnes 
was the first chairman of this regula-
tory commission. It is noteworthy 
that when the Cawker case reached 
the court in 1911, Barnes was then 
a member of this tribunal and con-
curred in the decision. 
The statutory definition of "public 
utility" in § 1797m-l has not been 
amended in any relevant portion since 
this court's decision in Cawker, and 
the same definition may be found to-
day in § 196.01 (1), Stats. This court 
has long been committed to the prin-
ciple that a construction given to a 
statute by the court becomes a part 
thereof, unless the legislature sub-
* Sec Crow, Legislative Control of Public 
Utilities in Wisconsin (1933) 18 Marquette 
LR 80, 
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sequently amends the statute to effect 
a change.5 
The courts of California,6 Mis-
souri,7 Ohio,8 and Pennsylvania9 have 
similarly held that a landlord who 
furnishes utility service to his tenants 
is not a public utility within the def-
inition thereof contained in the ap-
plicable state law. Appellant has been 
unable to cite a single authority to 
the contrary. 
We consider the Pennsylvania 
court's recent decision in Drexel-
brook Associates v Pennsylvania 
Public Utility Commission10 to be 
highly significant in view of appel-
lant's argument that the rule an-
nounced in Cawker should not be 
extended to a large apartment com-
plex such as the instant one. Drexel-
brook Associates is the owner of a 
real-estate development known as 
Drexelbrook. It is a garden-type 
apartment village with 90 buildings 
containing 1,223 residential units, 9 
retail stores, and a club with a 
5
 Moran v Quality Aluminum Casting Co. 
(1967) 34 Wis 2d 542, 556, 150 NW2d 137; 
Mednis v Industrial Commission (1965) 27 
Wis 2d 439, 444, 134 NW2d 416; Hahn v 
Walworth County (1961) 14 Wis 2d 147, 154, 
109 NW2d 653, 94 ALR2d 618; Meyer v In-
dustrial Commission (1961) 13 Wis 2d 377, 
382, 108 NW2d 556: Thomas v Industrial 
Commission (1943) 243 Wis 231, 240, 10 
NW2d 206, 147 ALR 103; Milwaukee County 
v City of Milwaukee (1933) 210 Wis 336, 
341. 246 NW 447; Eau Claire National Bank 
v Benson (1900) 106 Wis 624, 627, 628, 82 
NW 604. 
dining room, swimming pool, skating 
rink, and tennis courts. The Pennsyl-
vania supreme court held that the 
tenants of a landlord, although many 
in number, do not constitute "the 
public" within the meaning of Penn-
sylvania's Public Utility Law, but 
constitute rather a defined, privileged, 
and limited group. The court held 
that the proposed service of electricity 
to them thus would be private in 
nature. 
As in the instant appeal, it was 
argued in the Drexelbrook Associates 
case that regulation was desirable to 
protect the interest of the tenants in 
so large an apartment complex. In 
disposing of this argument the Penn-
sylvania court stated: 
"The controlling consideration is 
not whether regulation is desirable* 
but whether appellant [Drexelbrook 
Associates] is subject to regulation 
under the Public Utility Law/'11 
Judgment affirmed. 
6 Story v Richardson (1921) 186 Cal 162, 
198 Pac 1057, 18 ALR 750. 
7
 Missouri ex rel. and to use of Cirese v 
Missouri Pub. Service Commission (1944) 
— Mo App —, 54 PUH NS 169, 178 SW2d 
788. 
8
 Jonas v Swetland Co. 119 Ohio St 12, 
PUR1928D 825, 162 NE 45. 9
 Drexelbrook Associates v Pennsylvania 
Pub. Utility Commission (1965) 418 Pa 430, 
60 PUR3d 175. 212 A2d 237. 
10
 Supra, footnote 9. 
« Id. 418 Pa at pp. 441, 442, 60 PUR3d at 
p. 181, 212 A2d at p. 242. 
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DREXELBROOK ASSOCIATES v P. U. C. 
PENNSYLVANIA SUPREME COURT 
Drexelbrook Associates 
V 
Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission 
— Pa —, 212 A2d 237 
June 30, 1965 
APPEAL from judgment affirming commission decision which > disapproved proposed sale and transfer of utility facilities 
to apartment complex; reversed and remanded with instructions 
to grant approval. 
Public utilities, §41 — Private service — Landlord service to tenants. 
1. An apartment complex proposing to render service to its tenants only, and 
at a profit, serves a defined, privileged, and limited group, and the proposed 
sendee to them is private in nature and not a public utility service since it 
would not be furnished "to or for the public," as provided by Public Utility 
Law, p. 175. 
Consolidation, merger, and sale, §35 — Grounds for approval or disapproval — 
Loss of jurisdiction over service. 
2. It was error for the commission to disallow the sale and transfer of 
utility distribution and metering facilities to an apartment complex on the 
ground that the transfer would remove from commission supervision service 
presently subject to its jurisdiction, for the commission did not have juris-
diction with respect to public policy in this matter since the service was not 
rendered "to or for the public," as provided by the Public Utility Law; the 
controlling consideration was not whether regulation was desirable but 
whether the transferee of the facilities was subject to regulation under the 
law, p. ISO, 
(COHEN*, J., with whom EAGEN, J., joins, dissents, p. 182.) 
A P P E A R A N C E S : Irving R. Segal, 
Philadelphia, for appellant; Daniel F . 
Joella, Harrisburg, for appellee. 
Before Bell, CJ., and Musmanno, 
Jones, Cohen, Eagen, O'Brien, and 
Roberts, J J . 
ROBERTS,, J . : 
[1] Applications to the public util-
l T h e approval was sought under § 202(e) 
of the Public Utility Law, Act of May 28, 
1937, PL 1053, 66 PS § 1122(e), as amended 
ity commission were filed by the Phil-
adelphia Electric Company and the 
Philadelphia Suburban Water Com-
pany seeking approval of the transfer 
by sale of certain equipment.1 Com-
mission approval would enable the 
applicants to transfer distribution, 
service-supply, and metering equip-
by Act of August 24, 1963, PL 1225, §2, 66 
PS § 1122 (Supp 1964). 
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nient to Drexclbrook Associates, a reg-
istered limited partnership which owns 
and manages a real-estate development 
known as "Drexelbrook." Drexcl-
brook, located in Drexel Hill, Dela-
ware county, is a garden-type apart-
ment village with 90 buildings, con-
taining 1,223 residential units, 9 retail 
stores, various public areas, and a club 
with a dining room, swimming pool, 
skating rink, and tennis courts. 
The equipment involved in the pro-
posed transfer was installed originally 
by the applicants in the buildings and 
stores of the development and is pres-
ently used by the applicants to furnish 
gas, water, and electric service directly 
to Drexelbrook tenants. Upon con-
clusion of the transfers, water service 
would be supplied by the water com-
pany directly to Drexelbrook Asso-
ciates at four metering points, and gas 
and electric service would be supplied 
by the electric company to Drexelbrook 
Associates at a single metering loca-
tion.2 Drexelbrook Associates would 
purchase gas, electricity, and w^ter 
from the applicants at the proposed 
metering points. In turn, it would as-
sume the obligation and sole respon-
sibility for furnishing and distributing 
gas, electricity, and water to its tenants 
and for servicing and maintaining the 
transferred facilities. 
With respect to electricity and gas, 
Drexelbrook Associates assumes that 
it would qualify for wholesale tariff 
* Presently, water service is supplied at 106 
metering points, electric service is supplied at 
1,335 metering locations, and gas service is 
supplied at 1,283 existing locations. 
3
 Although the commission itself seems to 
have assumed previously that Drexelbrook 
would qualify for the wholesale rates, it now 
questions for the first time in its brief before 
this court whether Drexelbrook is so quali-
fied. Even assuming the relevance of this 
60 PUR 3d 1 
rates at such single metering points,3 
and proposes to retain the transferred 
meters in order to measure each of its 
tenant's individual consumption. It 
has agreed to bill each tenant on the 
basis of such consumption at the same 
rate which the tenant would pay if 
he received service individually and di-
rectly from the electric company, there-
by enabling it to make a profit. In 
like manner, Drexelbrook Associates 
assumes that, with respect to water, 
it would also qualify for the applicable 
wholesale tariff rates based on single 
point water metering service.4 It pro-
poses to continue to furnish water to 
apartment tenants on the existing basis 
by including the charges for water 
services within the rent. Evidently, 
remctcring of water at a profit is con-
templated only with respect to the 
swim club and store tenants. 
The commission dismissed the appli-
cations without hearing on August 19, 
1963. Drexelbrook Associates then 
asked the commission to reopen the 
matter and to grant it leave to inter-
vene and offer evidence in support of 
the applications. The request was 
granted but after a subsequent hearing 
the commission by a vote of 3-2, dis-
missed the applications on Tune 8, 
1964. Thereafter, Drexelbrook Asso-
ciates appealed to the superior court6 
which divided equally, thereby affirm-
ing the commission's order. A major-
ity of the superior court then certified 
factor in the present proceeding, we will not 
now indulge in a fact-finding process which 
the commission itself did not see fit to under-
take. 
4
 See footnote 3, supra. 
5
 Neither the Philadelphia Electric Company 
nor the Philadelphia Suburban Water Com-
pany, applicants before the commission, took 
an appeal from the commission's determination. 
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the case to this court for consideration 
and decision.8 
In dismissing the applications, the 
commission held that upon consumma-
tion of the proposed transfers of the 
designated service and metering equip-
ment, appellant would become subject 
to the provisions of the Public Utility 
Law.7 For that reason, the commis-
sion concluded that it would be neces-
sary for appellant to seek commission 
authorization to furnish the public 
utility services now rendered by the 
applicants. 
The term "public utility" is defined 
in § 2 of the Public Utility Law as 
including "persons or corporations 
• . . owning or operating in this 
commonwealth equipment, or facilities 
for: (a) [Pjroducing, generating, 
transmitting, distributing, or furnish-
ing natural or artificial gas, electricity, 
. . . to or for the public for com-
pensation; (b) [d iver t ing , develop-
ing, pumping, impounding, distribut-
ing, or furnishing water to or for the 
public for compensation . . . ."8 
(Emphasis supplied.) The question 
presented is whether the service which 
appellant proposes to furnish to its 
tenants would be service to or for the 
public within the meaning of the stat-
ute. 
A number of decisions prove help-
ful in deciding the question in this 
case. In Borough of Ambridge v 
Pennsylvania Pub. Service Commis-
sion, 108 Pa Super Ct 298, PUR1933 
D 298, 165 Atl 47, allocatur den 108 
Pa Super Ct xxiii, where a manufac-
turer who furnished water to another 
«See Act of June 24, 1895, PL 212, §10, 
17 PS § 197. 
* Act of May 28, 1937, PL 1053, §§ 1 ct seq., 
as amended, 66 PS §§ 1101 et seq. 
manufacturer was held not to be ren-
dering a public service, the court said 
that " ' [t] he public or private character 
of the enterprise does not depend . . . 
upon the number of persons by whom 
it is used, but upon whether or not 
it is open to the use and service of all 
members of the public who may require 
it • . . . ' " (Emphasis supplied.) 
108 Pa Super Ct at p. 304, PUR1933 
D at p 301, 165 Atl at p. 49. Aroni-
mink Transp. Co. v Pennsylvania Pub. 
Service Commission (1934) 111 Pa 
Super Ct 414, 5 P U R NS 279, 170 
Atl 375, was a case where a corpora-
tion operated apartment houses and 
furnished bus transportation to its ten-
ants. Because the corporation served 
only those who were selected as tenants 
—a special class of persons not open 
to the indefinite public—the court held 
the service to be private in nature.9 
The court concluded that the service 
rendered was merely incidental to the 
business of maintaining the apartment 
house, and the fact that the transpor-
tation was furnished to hundreds of 
individuals residing in the 288 apart-
ments did not transform the private 
nature of the service into a "public 
service." 
Overlook Develop. Co. v Penn-
sylvania Pub. Service Commission, 
101 Pa Super Ct 217, PUR1931E 68, 
affd per curiam (1932) 306 Pa 43, 
158 Atl 869, involved a land develop-
ment company which distributed water 
not only to vendees situated on its 
previously owned tract of land, but 
also to owners of adjacent land. The 
court held the service was not open 
8 Act of Mav 23, 1937, PL 1053. §2(17) (a) & (b), 66*PS §1102(17) (a) & (b). 9
 The court cited with approval the quota-
tion from Borough of Ambridge, supra, in 
text 
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to the indefinite public but, being con-
fined to privileged individuals, was pri-
vate in nature. Significantly, the com-
mission itself, in Camp Wohclo v 
Novitiate of St. Isaac Jogues (1958), 
36 Pa PUC 377, adhered to the doc-
trine expressed in Overlook, stating 
that "a public use . . . 'is not con-
fined to privileged individuals, but is 
open to the indefinite public' " and that 
u
 'it is this indefinite or unrestricted 
quality that gives it its public char-
acter.'" PUR1931Eatp . 73.) 
Although the present case involves 
the owner of an apartment complex 
which proposes to render service to its 
.tenants and to no one else, the com-
mission held that the contemplated 
service would not be merely incidental 
to the operation of Drexelbrook, but 
would be a separate and distinct enter-
prise for profit, subject to the Public 
Utility Law. In part, the commission 
based its conclusion on the fact that 
appellant does not propose to reserve 
the right to select its customers, but 
would obligate itself under separate 
and uniform contracts to furnish serv-
ice to all tenants, present and future, 
in its development. The fallacy of 
this reasoning is shown in the dis-
senting opinion of the commission 
chairman which stated that the test 
"is not [whether] all tenants . . . 
are being furnished [service,] but 
*° (1964) 41 Pa PUC 505, 515. 
11
 The record shows many instances where 
landlords and owners of large apartments and 
•office buildings purchase utility service on a 
wholesale basis and furnish such service to 
their office and apartment tenants. Included 
among these are the Presidential Apartments, 
Rittenhouse Claridge, Rittcnhouse Savoy (all 
in Philadelphia), and Lynnewood Gardens (in 
Montgomery county), the latter containing 
1,796 apartment units. 
w I n its brief, the commission says: "Ap-
pellant would have this Honorable Court be-
3 ) PUR 3d 1 
whether anybody among the public 
outside of the Drexelbrook group is 
privileged to demand scrvice.,,1° In 
the present case the only persons who 
would be entitled to and who would 
receive service are those who have 
entered into or will enter into a land-
lord-tenant relationship with appellant. 
Here, as in Aronimink, those to be 
serviced consist only of a special class 
of persons—those to be selected as 
tenants—and not a class open to the 
indefinite public. Such persons clearly 
constitute a defined, privileged, and 
limited group and the proposed service 
to them would be private in nature.11 
The commission concedes that a 
landlord would not be a public utility 
if its charge for utility service is in-
cluded, unitemized, in a flat rental. 
The commission contends, however, 
that appellant's intention to remeter 
the service, charge separately for it, 
and make a profit presents a "different 
situation" and results in the proposed 
service being public in nature.12 How-
ever, it is apparent that whether or 
not the utility charge is included in a 
flat rental or determined through sub-
metering, it still constitutes compensa-
tion to the landlord. We fail to see 
how the method of computing the 
charge for the utility service is in any 
sense determinative of or relevant to 
the issue of whether the service is "to 
lieve that there is considerable submetering by 
landlords without certificates of public con-
venience from the commission. . , . Ob-
viously the minority opinion [apparently of 
the commission] and appellant confuse those 
situations where a landlord receives wholesale 
rates and includes the cost of these services 
in the rent, with the obviously different situa-
tion involved in the instant appeals. Admitted-
ly the Pennsylvania Utility Commission is not 
a rent control commission and has asserted no 
jurisdiction over rents," (Emphasis in orig-
inal.) 
DRKXELKROOK ASSOCIATES v 1\ U. C -
or for the public." "[T]he charge to 
the tenant based upon the amount 
which the particular tenant actually 
uses (as proposed in this application) 
is far more equitable to the tenant than 
imposing a hidden and unidentified 
item in the rental charge without any 
showing by the landlord of the basis 
on which the utility charge is calcu-
lated."13 
Even the members of the superior 
court who voted to uphold the com-
mission's order stated "that the 
distinction made by the commission be-
tween including the cost of utility serv-
ice in a fiat rental charge and sub-
metering is a distinction without a 
difference and the question in this ap-
peal does not turn on that fact."14 
These judges also said with respect 
to situations where the charge is in-
cluded in the rent: "We are not so 
naive as to believe that the cost of 
utilities are supplied free to the ten-
ants; nor so naive as to believe that 
the landlord does not make a profit 
under such circumstances.,,15 
However, we cannot agree with the 
view, expressed by the three affirming 
judges of the superior court, that the 
present case may be distinguished from 
13
 From the dissenting opinion of the com-
mission chairman. 41 Pa PUC at p. 519. 
H (1965) 206 Pa Super Ct at 135, 212 A2d 
229, 233. 
Thus, in this regard, the commission dis-
senters and both the three affirming and two 
of the dissenting judges of the superior court 
were in agreement 
»206 Pa Super Ct at p. 135, 212 A2d at p. 
233. 
A significant decision, not discussed by the 
majority of the commission in the present case, 
is Pennsylvania Pub. Utility Commission v 
Philadelphia Electric Co. (1942) 23. Pa PUC 
320. In that decision the commission deter-
mined that it would not prohibit the remctering 
or resale of current by the owner of an office 
building to his tenants. For a further discus-
sion of the case, sec footnote 20, infra. 
Overlook and Aronimink on the 
basis of the sequence of ownership of 
the equipment involved. In the view 
of those judges, the cases are distin-
guishable on the theory that apart-
ment owners or landowners initially 
owned the equipment in Overlook and 
Aronimink, while in the present case 
the equipment, from the time of instal-
lation to the application for transfer, 
has been owned by public utilities sub-
ject to commission jurisdiction. 
The determination of whether ap-
pellant would be serving the public 
after the transfers are completed is 
unrelated to the identity of the trans-
feror of the designated assets or to the 
fact that the equipment previously had 
"been dedicated to a public use and 
impressed with a public interest."16 
The equipment possesses no mystical 
qualities or characteristics which ren-
der the service for which it is utilized 
a public service irrespective of the pri-
vate or public nature of the services 
or the definite (tenants) or indefinite 
(public) identification of the persons 
served. The determination as to 
whether appellant would be engaged 
in a public utility service cannot be 
predicated upon whether it originally 
18 206 Pa Super Ct at p. 136, 212 A2d at p. 
234. This concept, taken from rate-making 
decisions (e.g., City of Pittsburgh v Pennsyl-
vania Pub. Service Commission [1949] 165 
Pa Super Ct 519, 528, 82 PUR XS 572, 69 A2d 
844, 849, allocatur den 165 Pa Super Ct xxv), 
is here misapplied when utilized as a considera-
tion in determining whether the service which 
appellant seeks to render to its tenants consti-
tutes public service under the Public Utility 
Law. Such application, if correct, would, for 
all practical purposes, always preclude a trans-
fer of utility equipment to a nomttility because, 
once included in the rate structure of a public 
utility, that equipment would be immutably 
stamped with public use and interest charac-
teristics. 
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installed the necessary equipment at 
the time of construction, later installed 
it itself, or purchased it from a utility 
which had originally installed it.17 
We hold, therefore, that the pro-
posed service which appellant would 
render in the present case would not 
constitute it a public utility within the 
meaning of § 2 of the Public Utility 
Law since such service would not be 
furnished "to or for the public.,, 
[2] In the alternative, the commis-
sion held that the transfers could not 
be approved even if appellant would 
not be rendering a public utility service 
upon consummation of the proposed 
transfers because the commission could 
not "disregard the public interest and 
abandon the public and the consumers 
17
 The dissenting opinion in the superior 
court quite aptly stated: 
"If the facilities here involved had been orig-
inally installed by the landlord under single 
metering and wholesale rates granted to the 
landlord by the utilities, there would be no 
doubt of the validity of the transaction. As the 
record in this case shows, such operations ex-
ist . . . in Pennsylvania. The circum-
stances that the landlord now seeks single 
meter and wholesale rates should make no 
difference in the result. What is legal in one 
case does not thereby become invalid in the 
other. The sequence of events should not be 
controlling." 206 Pa Super at p. 12S, 212 A2d 
at p. 235. 
13 41 Pa PUCa t p. 512. 
Presumably, the commission acted under § 
202 of the Public Utility Law. Act of May 
28, 1937, PL 1053, as amended, 66 PS § 1122. 
That section requires the commission's approv-
al, evidenced by a certificate of public con-
venience, prior to the transfer of assets by a 
public utility to any person and prior to any 
abandonment of any service to patrons. The is-
suance of such a certificate is based upon the 
commission's determination that it is necessary 
-or proper for the service, accommodation, con-
venience, or safety of the public. Although 
factual and legal questions have been raised 
which cast doubt on the applicability of that 
portion of § 202 which involves abandonment of 
service, the commission has made no specific 
findings with respect^ to such questions and 
our disposition of this appeal makes it un-
necessary for us to express our views respect-
ing them. 
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who would become affected by the 
approval of the applications, to un-
certain but definitely less desirable 
prospects.,,1S The members of the 
superior court who voted to affirm the 
commission agreed with its position, 
stating that "the commission, in exer-
cising its administrative discretion, not 
only may but should deny the transfer 
of patrons out from under regulation, 
even where their consent has been ob-
tained, in circumstance? such as this 
case presents, in the public interest and 
as a matter of public policy."19 
In support of this alternative hold-
ing, the commission engaged in much 
speculation as to possible evils which 
would flow from consummation of the 
proposed transfer.20 In substance, 
19 206 Pa Super Ct at p. 134, 135, 212 A2d 
at p. 233. 
20
 For example, the commission suggested 
that, without its supervision, Drexelbrook ten-
ants might eventually be subject to discrimina-
tion in rates as compared to other tenants 
who are protected by commission jurisdiction; 
that the practice of submetering and resale 
might adversely affect the revenue return of 
the public utility companies involved and cause 
increases in rates to the remaining customers 
of such utilities; and, in the alternative, that a 
change in rate structure increasing wholesale 
prices might make the landlord's utility serv-
ice unprofitable. The commission also voiced 
concern over possible inaccuracies in meters. 
It is appropriate to recall the words of the 
commission in Pennsylvania Pub, Utility Com-
mission v Philadelphia Electric Co. (1942) 
23 Pa PUC 320, 42 PUR NS 126, when it 
expressly refused to prohibit remetering by 
a landlord: 
"[W]e deem it appropriate to state that we 
have considered ^ the advisability of a rule 
absolutely prohibiting remetering or resale of 
current. The so-called 'practical1 difficulties 
envisaged by respondent as resulting from such 
a rule do not require detailed comment, but 
it may be observed that some predictions could 
not reasonably be expected to eventuate and 
the fulfillment of others might well produce 
compensating benefits. Also, we have no doubt 
of our jurisdiction to consider the reasonable-
ness and justness of any tariff rule and the 
practice thereunder, and to take appropriate 
corrective action if the rule appears unreason-
able or its application unjust: Hickey v Phila-
l \ C. 
however, the position of both the com-
mission majority and the affirming' 
members of the superior court can be 
reduced to the proposition that it is 
against public policy to approve the 
transfer since it would remove from 
commission supervision service now 
subject to its jurisdiction. Such rea-
soning disregards the express formula-
tion of public policy by the legislature 
embodied in the statutory definition of 
the term "public utility.'' That provi-
sion confers jurisdiction on the com-
mission only where the service in-
volved is rendered "to or for the pub-
lic." The controlling consideration is 
not whether regulation is desirable, but 
whether appellant is subject to regu-
lation under the Public Utility Law. 
Klawansky v Pennsylvania Pub. Serv-
ice Commission (1936) 123 Pa Super 
Ct 375, 382, 17 PUR NS 401, 187 
Atl 248, 251. If the legislature did 
not deem it necessary to confer juris-
diction on the commission with respect 
to the service proposed by appellant 
(as the commission conceded for pur-
poses of its alternative holding), then 
the absence of such jurisdiction as a 
result of the consummation of the pro-
posed transfer would not and could not 
contravene public policy. Further-
more, the possible evils which the 
commission envisaged as a result of 
the absence of its supervision could 
come to fruition irrespective of whether 
a landlord originally installs facilities 
or later purchases them from a public 
utility, or whether the charge for serv-
ice is on a metered basis or included 
in a flat rental without itemization. 
It seems obvious that the same pro-
jected evils which the commission ma-
jority envisaged as possibilities in the 
present case may be equally posited 
in other instances and cases previously 
approved by the commission and the 
superior court.21 
We hold, therefore, that the com-
mission erred as a matter of law in 
holding that Drexelbrook Associates 
would become a public utility upon 
consummation of the proposed trans-
fers, and that the commission also 
erred in alternatively holding that the 
allowance of the transfers would con-
travene public policy if the commis-
sion thereby lost its jurisdiction over 
the service involved. 
The order is reversed. The record 
delphia Electric Co. (1936) 122 Pa Super Ct 
213, 220, 14 PUR NS 349, 184 Ati 553. Aside 
from 'practical* considerations and technical 
objections to jurisdiction and procedure, our 
decision not to require prohibition of rcmeter-
ing or resale turns upon our conclusion that 
the record does not show such a requirement 
to be necessary at this time for public pro-
tection; . . . ." 23 Pa PUC at p. 322, 
42 PUR NS at p. 127. 
This language of the commission is especial-
ly notable and meaningful because it was di-
rectly at odds with the opinion of a dissenting 
member of the commission. The dissenting 
commissioner contended that "the prohibition 
of resales of electric current involving a profit 
to landlords is a requirement that is necessary 
for public protection." 23 Pa PUC at p. 324, 
42 PUR NS at p. 128. The dissent also stated: 
"When the Philadelphia Electric Company 
sells to a landlord and the landlord resells to 
a tenant at a profit to the landlord, the land-
lord in my opinion becomes a public utility wd 
has no ri^ht to extort a profit for such sale." 
23 Pa PUC at p. 323, 42 PUR NS at p. 128. 
it is significant that, in the face of this dis-
sent, the majority of the commission held oth-
erwise. 
21
 See Pennsylvania Pub. Utility Commission 
v Philadelphia Electric Co. (1942) 23 Pa 
PUC 320, 42 PUR NS 126, supra, footnote 20; 
Aronimink Transp. Co. v Pennsylvania Pub. 
Service Commission (1934) 111 Pa Super Ct 
414, 5 PUR NS 279, 170 Atl 375, supra, text 
at p. 177; Borough of Ambridge v Pennsyl-
vania Pub. Service Commission, 10S Pa Super 
Ct 298, PUR1933D 298, 165 Atl 47, supra, 
text at p. 177; Overlook Develop. Co. v 
Pennsylvania Pub. Service Commission, 101 
Pa Super Ct 217, PUR1931E 63, affd per 
curiam (1932) 306 Pa 43, 158 Atl S69, supra, 
text at p. 177. See also footnote 11, supra. 
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is remanded and the commission is 
directed to approve the applications 
and to issue the appropriate certifi-
cates. 
